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The Power of Expression 
N ow that I have all of you ... family, friends, students, and colleagues ... here together at the same time, in one place, I eagerly seize the opportunity to answer a guestion I've been asked many, 
many times. That guest ion is: What is it that you do? 
What do I do? The fast answer is that I study very young children learning 
language and I teach other persons what I know about how children learn 
language, why infants even begin to learn language in the first place, and what 
it is they learn about language in the first three years of life. I ordinarily do this 
teaching in 2 courses: 2 semesters, 30 weeks, 60 hours. I am now about to sum 
it all up in the next 40 minutes. 1 
I owe the title of my talk today to the philosopher, Charles Taylor: 
What comes about through the development of language in the broadest sense 
is the coming to be of expressive power.2 
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The power of expression comes from using the conventional, linguistic 
meanings in words and grammar for expressing the private, personal meanings 
we have in mind. These personal meanings are the contents of our beliefs, 
desires, and feelings and they are unobservable unless we can somehow embody 
them and make them manifest.3 This is what language does. Language takes 
these private meanings that we have in mind and makes them public, in acts 
of expression and interpretation, so that other persons can know them. 
Language uses different notation systems-speech, gesture, or print-
for representing the conventional meanings that are invested in words and 
grammar. But regardless of the notation it uses, language affords us this process 
of continuous translation between public and private meanings. The words and 
sentences I am saying now embody what I am thinking and you, in turn, are 
using my words and sentences to set up thoughts in your own mind which will, 
hopefully, match what I am thinking. Thus, the meanings oflanguage provide 
a way for us to read each other's minds. We pretty much take that for granted 
today. 
But in the 1960s, when I first started thinking of the importance of 
meaning for language development, meaning was not a popular topic in 
linguistics. Correspondingly, although hard to believe today, meaning was 
overlooked as well in studies oflanguage development. It was in this climate, 
that I was asked to present my dissertation research4 to a Columbia University 
faculty seminar. They were a distinguished group of men: linguists, philoso-
phers, sociologists, psychologists. They listened politely, smiled a bit conde-
scendingly, and finally let me have it: "How could you possibly hope to know 
what a child means when we don't even know what adults mean half the time?" 
Well, it isn't so terribly complicated, I replied; we may not know the abstract 
semantic structure of a child's sentence but we have little or no difficulty 
knowing what that sentence is about. Quite simply, very little children talk 
about what they are doing or about to do or want someone else to do and those 
things are usually evident or imminent in the context. In fact, parents depend 
on it and routinely interpret children's messages all the time. Knowing what 
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a child's message is about, one can attribute something of what the child 
assumes the words in the message mean. 
We've been studying meaning in child language ever since and, by and 
large, we study what and how children learn about the conventional, linguistic 
meanings invested in words and the structures of grammar. I will be talking 
today about some of these developments in the first few years oflife, and about 
some of the developments in other aspects of children's thinking which 
contribute to these developments in language. But, to understand how children 
come to seek out and embrace the meanings in language in the first place, so 
as to make them their own, we need to look in the first year oflife for the origins 
of language in infancy. 
The human infant comes into the world without language but comes into 
theworld as a profoundly social creature, from the beginning. The evolutionary 
fallout from many generations of language is that the newborn infant is 
exquisitely prepared, at birth, to acquire a language: In the first few hours of 
life, a human infant can tell the difference between its own mother's voice and 
a strange female voice. 5 An infant as young as a few weeks old can hear the 
difference between categories of speech sounds, such as the difference between 
/p/ and /b/.6 And, virtually from the moment of birth, infants produce cries, 
whines, whimpers, and, eventually, smiles and laughs, to which their caregivers 
attribute meaning. We know, then, that certain basic capacities which serve 
language are already in place in the beginning of life. 
Two things about the expressions of a young infant are particularly 
noteworthy. One is the simple fact that the infant's smiles, frowns, laughs, and 
cries are close to our own, adult expressions and this, more than anything else, 
contributes to our identifying with the baby as human. But, second, a baby's 
smiles and cries allow us to attribute something else to the baby, something 
more than just the smile or cry itself We can attribute delight or distress, 
pleasure or pain, joy or misery. In short, the external and public expression we 
are seeing allows us to attribute something internal and private that the baby 
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is feeling. And it is this attribution-of the meaning of the expression-that 
we respond to when we respond to the baby. 
In the first year ofl ife developments occur in an infant's emotionality and 
social connectedness with other persons. And, at the same time, infants 
discover quite a lot about the physical world and the ways that persons and 
objects 'go together' in the everyday events of their lives. It is these emotional, 
social, and cognitive developments which bring an infant to the threshold of 
language. By the end of the first year, all that infants have learned about 
persons, objects, and the self inform the beliefs, desires, and feelings that they 
have. These cannot be articulated by the smiles, whines, and cries which served 
the younger infant so well. Other modes of expression are required and, waiting 
in the wings, is language. 
Children begin to acquire words slowly at first, in the second year, and 
their early words are fragile, tentative, and imprecise. But they soon pick up 
speed and, sometime toward the end of the second year, there is a burst in 
vocabulary as a child begins to use many different words and to use words more 
frequently and more easily. However, the words learned in the second year do 
nor replace the emotional displays which had served the younger infant so well 
in the first year. Sayingwords is not somerhing thar children begin to do instead 
of expressing emotion. Rather, children continue to express their feelings 
through displays of emotion as they learn the words to articulate what their 
feelings are about: the words which name the objects and circumstances of their 
emotional experiences, words like "more," "gone," "Mama," "cookie," "fall 
down." Because these words give public expression to a child's private 
meanings, other persons can know them, share them, and perhaps do 
something about them. 
The mentally constructed meanings which language expresses are 
unobservable representations which "we set up as we talk or listen and that we 
structure with elements, roles, strategies, and relations.''7 They are the mental 
contents individualsexpress when they talk, and that they construct when they 
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interpret the speech of other persons. These representations are set up in the 
part of mind that has traditionally been called 'working memory' or 'conscious-
ness' that aspect of mind that intervenes between what we perceive in the world 
and the knowledge that we have. A focus on these underlying representations 
for language connects a theory of language development to theories of 
intentional states in philosophy8 and, in psychology, to "mental models," 
"mental spaces," "complex mental attitudes," and the like which are the 
products in consciousness of what has come to be called the "computational 
mind. "9 Constructing these internal, personal representations in conscious-
ness, as we talk and listen, are the critical aspect of thinking for language, and 
for the process oflanguage acquisition. These representations are cognitive not 
linguistic constructions, but Fauconnier reminds us that "language does not 
come without them." 10 
The acquisition of language depends, then, upon changes in the repre-
sentations a child can set up and hold in mind. Two principles follow from this 
assumption. One is what] have cal led the Principle of Discrepancy: Children 
will be pressed to use speech (or gestures) when objects represented privately 
in consciousness are not perceptible to others in the context. Language will be 
required so that other persons will know what the child has in mind the child's 
mental meanings which are otherwise unobservable. Thus, the discrepancy 
between the child's world as it is, and the world the child expects, wants, or 
imagines to be, creates the demand for language. 
One-year-olds most often express evident content. The meaning of an 
expression is evident when it matches something that is al ready in the context. 
For example, a child looks at a doll and says "baby." The child sees the doll as 
she names it; it is evident.] n contrast, meaning is anticipative when the word 
points to an imminent event that does not match what is evident in the context. 
For example, a child saying "baby" as she searches for the doll. The child 
imagined the doll was among the other toys in the room as she named it; it was 
anticipated. In such anticipated meanings, representations in consciousness are 
constructed out of knowledge accessed from memory. If the Principle of 
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Discrepancy is correct, then anticipative meanings ought to increase with 
development, relative to evident meanings. And chis is, indeed, what happens 
in the second year when children show a spurt in vocabulary. An increase in the 
number of words they know is associated with an increase in anticipative 
meanings.11 
The second principle is what I have called the Principle of Elaboration: 
Children come to construct representations in consciousness chat are not only 
discrepant but are also increasingly elaborated. This is the result of learning 
more about the world: The child has a richer store of past experiences and 
knowledge out of which increasingly elaborated mental meanings can be 
constructed. The more elements and relations between them in these represen-
tations, the more the child wiil need to know of the words and structures of 
language for their expression. Thus, more of the language, and more complex 
language, will be learned because it will be required for expressing increasingly 
elaborated mental meanings. 
Certain meanings chat one-year-olds express have a focus on only a single 
element, which the child has in mind while looking, showing, giving, or 
pointing. For example, when a child looks at the doll, and says "baby." Still 
other mental meanings have a focus on an action of doing or going. Action-
based meanings entail several elements in a representation, with different roles 
and different relationships between elements according to the participants and 
the goal of the action. For example, a child says "baby" as she turns to her 
mother for help in putting the doll into a truck, or says "up" as she climbs onto 
a chair. 
Early words express these two kinds of meaning about equally as often-
one with a focus on a single element and the other with a focus on multiple 
elements. If the Principle of Elaboration is correct, then development should 
occur in the expression of mental meanings with a focus on more than one 
object or person, and on different roles and relations between objects and 
persons. And this too is what we have found: Words chat express dynamic, 
9 
action meanings increase in the second year and become far more frequent than 
words expressing stative meanings with a focus on only asingleelement. Single-
words can go just so far in expressing the more complex meanings that are tied 
to action. Children will be pressed, therefore, to learn verbs of movement and 
location, and to begin combining verbs with nouns and pronouns for simple 
sentences. And, indeed, simple sentences typically begin after a spurt in 
vocabulary. 
Children learn a simple sentence grammar for expressing a core of basic 
meanings. 12 These conventional, linguistic meanings in simple sentences are 
of two kinds. Certain meanings come from the particular words that children 
use often in their early phrases, words like "more" and "no." For example, 
"more juice" means recurrence because "more" means recurrence, and "no 
pocket in there" means nonexistence, because "no" means nonexistence. 
More important, however, are the grammatical meanings in sentences 
with verbs: The little sentences children say, like "ride bike," "I do it," "this go 
there." The meanings in most of a child's early sentences depend on categories 
of verbs that name actions or states, and that license the thematic relations of 
nouns to verbs. Thematic relations are meaning relations between words that 
come from the connections between things that 'go together' in the themes of 
everyday, ordinary events-like putting the doll into a truck, or a ba!J rolling 
down a hill, or a child eating a cookie. The thematic categories in early child 
sentences, formed from these thematic relationships, include the inanimate 
objects which are affected by an action, the animate objects which act or are 
agents of an action, and the places to which, or along which, actors or objects 
move. 
Children learn grammar by learning the verbs of the language and these 
thematic categories. The semantics of their simple sentences is in the thematic 
relations between verbs and nouns; the syntax of their simple sentences is in the 
formal configurations in which these thematic relations can appear in sen-
tences. The categories of verbs in early sentences distinguish between verbs that 
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do and do not name a movement: action and state verbs, and whether the goal 
of the action, or the focus of the state, is the location of an object: locative verbs. 
In sum, the linguistic meanings invested in simple sentences come from verbs 
of action, state, and location. These categories of verbs, in turn, guide the 
subsequent acquisition of questions, verb inflections, and, eventually, complex 
sentences. 13 
The point is that the meanings of words and sentences belong to the 
language: They come from the shared, agreed-upon meanings that words and 
sentences have for the persons who use them. In the beginning, the data for 
learning the meanings of language are in the circumstances of use in which 
children hear words and sentences. The meanings of early words like "cookie," 
"gone," "more," and "Mama," or little sentences like "eat meat," or "throw 
ball," can be gotten from the connections between the words and their 
corresponding events. Eventually, however, meaning in language becomes 
increasingly arbitrary and is no longer transparent in circumstances of use. 
Words like "citizen," "honor," and "trust" can only be learned indirectly, from 
the other words a child already knows. But that comes with the territory: 
Learning a language is learning the connections between sound and meaning 
which are conventional, shared, and public. 
However, it does 1 ittle good for a child to hear words and sentences spoken 
in relation to events, if the events themselves are not recognized and under-
stood. Children learn the meanings of words and structures of the language 
only insofar as they learn about objects and events in the world. Early sentences 
are not just a random sampling of all the possible meanings and structures in 
language. Instead, children select from the meanings available to them in what 
people say, only those which connect with what they know about the world of 
objects, events, and relations. This selection goes hand in hand with the 
frequency of different words and sentence structures in the speech they hear. 
And, in turn, relative frequency of words and sentence structures in the speech 
adults address to a child is guided by what people talking to children believe 
they know about and can, therefore, understand. 
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Just as caregivers base what they say on what they think a child knows, 
we can use the meanings in a child's language to form hypotheses about the 
child's concepts. What are the concepts we can attribute to a child, based on 
the meanings in a child's sentences? In fact, the continuity is fairly direct 
between meanings in early sentences and the cognitive, developmental history 
of the young language-learning child. In particular, rhe semantic roles in early 
sentences build on concepts of movement and location. The importance of 
movement and location has a long history in developmental psychology and has 
since been acknowledged in adult theoretical linguistics as well. 
Jean Piaget, in his several infant books, stressed again and again that 
children learn about objects in the world by acting on them and perceiving 
chem in different places. Infants learn ro move objects from place to place and 
discover chem anew in different places. 14 More recent, experimental studies of 
infant perception use moving objects and the locations ro which they move, for 
demonstrating what infants already know about objects even in the first few 
months oflife. 15 Through rheir perceptions and actions, infants come to form 
concepts of objects, movement, and location. And, correspondingly, move-
ment and location have since come ro figure prominently in adult linguistics, 
in theories of semantics as well as the structure and function of metaphor. 16 
Efforts such as these to understand the cognitive underpinnings of 
language ordinarily focus on one or another version of the ' mapping problem': 
How children attach rhe forms of language to concepts of objects, even rs, and 
relations in the world. This focus on the mapping problem, and the cognitive 
developments which contribute to solving it, has, by and large, been product-
oriented rather than process-oriented. The products emphasized in our 
research and theory are concepts, the forms of language, and connections 
between concepts and language forms. In fact , I think it's fair to say that most 
language study, with adults as well as children, is nor ordinarily concerned with 
process-with the on-line, moment-to- moment thinking char goes into 
actually saying and understanding words and sentences. 
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The underlying process for saying a sentence begins with a mental plan 
in consciousness and that mental plan entails several things: For one, construct-
ing the representation or mental meaning that the sentence is about and, for 
another, accessing the words, grammar, and other linguistic procedures needed 
to generate the sentence. We can see the effects of this on-line processing in the 
variable length and completeness of a child's sentences. For example, when a 
child has to access words that are new and infreciuent, or add certain kinds of 
complexity like negation or prepositions to a sentence, the cognitive load of the 
sentence increases and something has to give. The result is that children say 
sentences like "Mommy read book" and" no read book" but they are not likely 
to say the complete sentence "Mommy no read book." Negative sentences, or 
sentences with newly learned verbs, are shorter than are affirmative sentences 
with well-known verbs because negation and using new words in a sentence 
'costs' the child extra cognitive effort. And the converse is also true: Using 
freciuent, earlier-learned words and not adding complexity increases the 
probability that sentences will be longer and more complete. 17 
Thus, learning something of the words and grammar of a language 
doesn't mean that access for expression is automatic; far from it. Rather, the 
probabilities of saying words and sentences, in one or another situation, are 
determined by the ability to construct a mental meaning; by how familiar and 
freciuent the forms and meanings of language are; by support, or demands, 
from accompanying discourse; and other things besides. 
At the same time that al I this is going on for learning and saying words, 
thinking is needed as well for actions in other domains, such as emotional 
expression and play with objects. The cognitive resources of the young 
language-learning child need to be distributed among several developmental 
domains. This is apparent in the moment-to-moment contingencies between 
saying a word, and, for example, expressing emotion, or putting two objects 
together in play. For example, children simply do not say words, or express 
much emotion, in the moments when they are putting objects together in 
play. 18 This is, in part, because the action of putting two objects together, to 
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construct a thematic configuration wich chem in play, also entails a mental 
plan. le is yet another public expression of a hidden representation. In sum, 
learning and using language share cognitive resources with ocher aspects of a 
child's development. The distribution of chese resources influences che prob-
abilities associated with aces of expression, and influences how words and 
sentences come together with ocher actions chat children do. 
The ordinary chinking by which representations are constructed in 
consciousness are the unobservable facts in development. For language, the 
representations in these private, personal, mental meanings determine that 
knowledge of vocabulary, semantics, syntax, and procedures for discourse will 
be acquired. The focus in chis perspective is squarely on the mind of the child, 
to be sure, but that is not to deny the critical part played in all of this by the 
social world. However, the public meanings constructed between persons 
absolutely depend on the private meanings constructed within persons. This 
face was recognized by Fritz Heider, the founder of attribution theory in social 
psychology. He proposed that the psychology of persons guides the psychology 
of the interpersonal. 19 Attribution theory made clear that the beliefs, feelings, 
and desires ofindividuals must be taken into account in the effort to understand 
and explain coordinated, social activity. Social contexts depend upon what is 
in the minds of the participants, and actions of expressing and interpreting are 
central in all social activity. 
Mind and society are intimately connected, necessarily integrated, and 
fundamental in all thacwedo and all thacweare. And, mind and society depend 
upon language for their integration.Just think for a minute what it would be 
like if we didn't have language. If humans had never devised any language at 
all: We wouldn't know much about che world; we wouJdn'c know very much 
about one another; and we wouldn't know very much about ourselves. Such 
a creature in a world without language is very different from a newborn infant 
without language today. Barring any interfering factors, most children will 
learn co make the connections between form and meaning to acquire a 
language. le will happen, in part, because persons in the world will help them 
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to learn language. I twill happen also because they will want to learn a language. 
And ic will happen because cheywil I need to learn a language for the integration 
of mind and sociecy. 
A large pan of why languages began in the first place was no doubt the 
need in a sociecy for individuals to have this expressive power-to make 
externaJ and public to other persons what is otherwise internal and private to 
ourselves: The unobservable goals and plans, beliefs and desires, and the 
feelings we have that determine our actions and interactions. But, while 
language can express many aspects of the objects, circumstances, and feelings 
in our mental meanings, language also has limitations with respect to how 
much and how well we can express what we mean. For example, words fail us 
altogether when our feelings are most intense and we fall silent, waiting for the 
feelings to abate and the words to come. And meanings which are panicularly 
abstract and intense might be expressed only in private, by writing a poem, 
before being shared when someone else reads the poem. 20 Poetry is a special 
case where the personal expression transcends the interpersonal. 
So let me sum up at this point in my answer to the question: What is it 
that I do? I study the words and sentences of young children on the very 
threshold oflanguage, as they struggle with words to make them their own in 
their effons to express and articulate what they have in mind. The conven-
tional, public, linguistic meanings they learn are in small words and sentences, 
with extensions limited to the persons, objects, and events of their first three 
years . They are learning more about themselves and more about the world and 
they are acquiring the power of expression: First, by saying a word or two, and 
then, a sentence or two, and, eventually perhaps, by writing a poem. 
Because the words and grammar learned in the first three years are the 
currency for expression, they are the currency as well for a child's ensuing 
educational career. Schools use language; schools teach language. But how do 
schools let children exercise language for acts of expression and interpretation? 
We are all painfully aware of the violence in our cicy and in our schools. In a 
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very real sense, violence is an expressive act. But violence may be a default 
expression, when language has failed for expression, perhaps because the child 
and the school aren't talking the same language either figuratively or literally. 
The schools typically blame the child and, even more perniciously, the 
child's language. But in studies that I and my students have done, we've come 
to know very poor children who may well become casualties of education: Poor 
white children in South Baltimore, in Peggy Miller's dissertation, and poor, 
black children in New York, in Ira Blake's dissertation 21 and in my own 
studies. 22 We can tell you that when these children were 2- and 3-year-olds, 
what they knew of the words and grammar oflanguage was not different from 
the other children we've studied who are swimming in the main stream. Bue 
what might happen to chem in the schools? Why might they become children 
whose language does not serve them well in the schools for expression and 
interpretation? I venture to suggest that a child might abandon efforts at 
language for expression, because of a failure in the schools to accept differences 
in language, and individual differences in how children use language for 
expression . 
Which brings me to, Edward Lee Thorndike. 
As most of you, I knew Thorndike as one of the founding greats of 
American psychology and of educational psychology, in particular. 23 I knew of 
his "Law of Effect" and the major influence it had on learning theory. I knew 
something of his work as a lexicographer because I grew up with his 
dictionaries . And something that most of you probably do not know (unless 
you've taken TK5024) is that he was even the author of a theory of language 
development; he called it the 'babble-luck theory.' I work in his building and 
now I sit in his chair, which is why you are all here today. I did not know very 
much else about Thorndike until l began doing some reading to prepare for this 
talk. Perhaps because I wasn ' t looking for them, the echoes ofThorndike in my 
own work took me by surprise: In particular, his concern for individual 
differences, his passion for words and their meanings, his emphasis on the 
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probability that an act will be performed, and his insistence on observing what 
children do in order to understand what and how they learn. 
The card catalog in the library took me to the farthest reaches of the 
Russell Hall basement, where many of the miJI ions of words he wrote are kept. 
A slim volume he published in 1911 on Individuality was directed at the need 
in psychology, and in education, to acknowledge individual differences: "The 
early psychologists failed to see them precisely because the early psychology was 
partial and believed in a typical or pattern mind, a~er the fashion of which all 
minds were created, and from which they differed only by rare accidents. It 
studied 'the mind,' and neglected individual minds ... [but] Individuality is 
already clearly manifest in children of school age ... [and] Since human nature 
does not fall into sharply defined groups, we can I iterally never be sure of having 
a dozen pupils who need to be treated exactly alike."24 
He was a counter and lover of words and his preoccupation with words 
and their meanings came from the importance words have for learning, 
through "their connections with real things, qualities, acts, events, and 
relations .... The[se] connections operate in a mental 'set' and under the 
influence of more or less of the hearer-reader's entire mental equipment."25 He 
was the original 'connectionist'; the title of an anthology of his papers 
published in 1949, theyearthat he died, is Selected Writings from a Connectionist's 
Psychology.26 He pointed ro the strength orweightofrhese connections in terms 
of their potency, and the resulting probabilities with which they influence what 
animals, including children and other persons, actually do. The relative ease 
with which connections are formed depend upon three basic facts: the frequency 
with which an act is done; the attention the individual gives to the action; and, 
perhaps even more important, the intention in the act or what he called "the 
impulse to act." Thus, with his "Law of Exercise,'' he anticipated the 
epistemology ofJean Piaget, by stressing the importance of acting for learning. 
And, he anticipated the importance of concepts: In his highly influential 
monograph Animal fntelligence, his Columbia University dissertation pub-
lished in 1898, he wrote of "The Mental Fact in Association ... what is in an 
animal's mind when, having profited by numerous experiences, he has formed 
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the association and does the proper act." Thus, he began the quest for how 
cognitive concepts are formed "from direct connections to indirect connections 
in which a stock of isolated elements plays a part ... to discrimination, ... 
generalizations, ... abstractions."27 The title of his biography, by Geraldine 
Joncich, is The Sane Positivist. The sanity in his positivism came from his 
worrying about what happened in the head of that chicken or monkey or child 
he studied, even though all he could really know of it was the end result, the 
behavior. 
I will close with one last quote, this from Edward Lee Thorndike's 1946 
paper, "The Psychology of Semantics"28 : 
"Meanings are in persons' minds, not in words, and when we say that a word has 
or possesses such and such meanings, we are really saying that it has evoked, or 
caused, those meanings. Until it gets into a mind, a word is only puffi of air or 
streaks of ink. " 
That sounds right to me. 
I am gratified that some of what I have done in the last 25 years has 
continued in a small way what Edward Lee Thorndike began here almost 100 
years ago. I am very pleased and proud to be the Thorndike professor at 
Teachers College. Thank you. 
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